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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at revisiting the concept of ‘representation’, in order to 
discuss matters like truth value and the cultural and ideological importance of 
representations. 
 
Sinopse 
 
Neste artigo aborda-se o conceito de ‘representação’, discutindo as matérias 
do valor de verdade e da importância cultural e ideológica das representações. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is but one contribution to a relatively large research line under 
the heading ‘Representations of Portugal in Non-Portuguese Fiction’. The research 
line in question was started by me within the CEI (Centre for Intercultural Studies) 
at ISCAP (www.iscap.ipp.pt/~cei) and aims at mapping out representations of 
Portugal in non-Portuguese fiction. I wrote three papers on the subject: 
“Representations of Portugal in Herman Hesse, Philip Roth and Paul Auster”, 
already published in POLISSEMA 8, and two more are forthcoming (“John 
Berger’s Lisbon in Here Is Where we Meet’ and ‘Lisbon in that Summer of 1938: 
Antonio Tabucchi’s Pereira Declares”). 
While still following the same path, I now address more closely the 
theoretical questions raised by the concept of ‘representation’.  
 
On the concept of representation 
 
In a previous paper1 I considered ‘representation’ as the inscription of 
mental images/concepts of entities of a real or possible world by means of signs, 
be they icons, indices or symbols (Peirce’s terminology).  
As we know, in Peirce’s account of 1867-8, he called signs ‘representations’, 
and divided them in icons, indices and symbols. His definitions of these three types 
of ‘representations’ are, at this stage, a bit blurred, but, as this division remains 
throughout his work and what is intended by each of these categories is clarified as 
his work progresses, I shall consider, from this very beginning, their now (almost) 
commonly accepted definitions. 
  
                                                 
1 ‘Representations of Portugal in Hermann Hesse, Philip Roth and Paul Auster’ in POLISSEMA 8, 
Novembro 2008, Revista de Letras do ISCAP, Porto: Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do 
Porto, pp.57-88. 
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According to Ransdell (1997:36),  
 
If the sign’s representative clue is based on, or grounded in, a 
similarity (resemblance, likeness) to its object, then it is […] 
iconic. If it is based on a dyadic or existential relationship 
with its object, then it is […] indexical. And if it is based on 
nothing but the fact that it has the power to generate an 
interpretant sign of itself in which it will be interpreted as 
being a sign of that object – that is, if it is based on nothing 
but the fact that it has the power to generate an interpretant 
sign of itself in which it will be represented as a sign of that 
object – then it is a symbol. 
 
Elgin defines icons, indices and symbols in much the same way, except for 
the definition of index, in which she clearly mentions correlation as an instance of 
dyadic relationship: 
 
A sign’s status as an icon, index or symbol derives from its 
mode of reference. Icons refer by resemblance or, as Peirce said, 
“mere community in some quality”. Indices refer by a natural 
correlation or “correspondence in fact”. Symbols refer by 
convention. Thus, a portrait is considered an icon, its reference 
being secured by its likeness to its subject. 
A symptom is an index in that it in fact corresponds to a 
disease. And most denoting terms are symbols in Peirce’s 
sense, for their relation to their objects is a matter of arbitrary 
convention. (Elgin, 1996:181) 
 
In order to clear some of Peirce’s terminology and ideas, it is important to 
point out the following: in the process of representation, as he sees it, there are 
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three instances – sign-vehicle (or simply sign), object and interpretant; the 
interpretant is, for Peirce, our understanding of the sign-vehicle/object relation2. 
Thus, our understanding of the sign /object relation, be it monadic (icons), dyadic 
(indices), or triadic (symbols), is always mediated by some kind of mental image. 
Without mental image there is no representation, be it on the part of the producer, 
be it on the art of the receiver3. Now, we know very little about mental images, but 
we do know a lot more about images as sign inscriptions. One problem seems to 
be that the word ‘image’ is used in multiple senses, both referring to mental images 
and to signs. 
Mitchell (1986) addresses this issue not with the aim of producing a 
definition of the essential nature of images, but rather with the aim of examining 
the ways we use the word ‘image’ in a number of institutionalized discourses 
(ibid.:9 and ff.). According to him, images are based on the concepts of likeness, 
resemblance or similitude; as such, they may be divided (by means of a diagram of a 
family tree) in graphic (pictures, statues, designs), optical (mirrors, projections), 
perceptual (sense data, ‘species’, appearances), mental (dreams, memories, ideas, 
fantasmata) and verbal images (metaphors, descriptions) (ibid.:10). This 
differentiation, he claims, is based on boundaries between different institutional 
discourses, and by ‘institutional discourses’ he means the discourse of intellectual 
disciplines4 (ibid.:9-10). If that is so, that is, if all five types of images are placed at 
the same level in a family tree (he even calls them ‘the family of images’) and if the 
boundaries between them are set by means of differentiation between institutional 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, for Peirce, each of these three instances is a sign in itself. Hence the fact that 
Ransdell uses the designation ‘interpretant sign’. 
3 This can be corroborated by ethnographers’ reports on the fact that peoples who have never seen 
photographs have to learn how to decode what is depicted in them (Mitchell, 1986:65). 
4 Thus, “mental imagery belongs to psychology and epistemology; optical imagery to physics; 
graphic, sculptural, and architectural imagery to the art historian; verbal imagery to the literary critic; 
perceptual images occupy a kind of border region where physiologists, neurologists, psychologists, art 
historians, and students of optics find themselves collaborating with philosophers and literary critics” (ibid.:9-
10). 
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discourses, then, when he talks about mental images, he is within the realm of 
discourse, or, as he says, institutional discourses, and so he is talking about 
inscriptions of mental images, i.e. representations and not about mental images 
“proper”. He himself acknowledges that when he says that people may report 
experiencing images in their heads while reading or dreaming, but we only have their word for this 
(ibid.:13). In spite of the fact that the aim of this categorization is not to advance 
the theoretical understanding of the image, and Mitchell is very clear about this, it 
nevertheless poses a number of theoretical questions, the most important of which 
is that one thing is a mental image, say, a dream, a memory and so forth, and 
another thing is its inscription: without inscription the whole edifice of the family 
of images would fall apart, as there is no way to test the principles of likeness, 
resemblance or similitude that are at its basis; on the other hand, if we are within 
the realm of discourse when talking about mental images, then we need to make 
use of other members of ‘the family of images’, say, graphic or verbal, to inscribe 
the mental image, and this somehow makes Mitchell’s diagram of the family of 
images not very adequate, because the inscription of a mental image in graphic or 
verbal terms would automatically shift it respectively into the categories of graphic 
or verbal image. 
Now from this reasoning on Mitchell’s approach it does not follow that I 
am against it. In fact, what I am doing here is exactly within the line of his aim, 
which is “to open up for inquiry the ways our ‘theoretical’ understanding of 
imagery grounds itself in social and cultural practices, and in a history fundamental 
to our understanding not only of what images are but of what human nature is or 
might become” (ibid.:9). 
But to do so, I think we should leave categorizations of images aside and 
take a leap to concentrate on images as representations, i.e., we should concentrate 
on trying to answer the question: by what means does the inscription of a mental 
image/concept of an entity represent that entity? 
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From what I have written so far about Mitchell one would expect his answer 
to be by likeness, resemblance or similitude, but things are not that simple. In fact, 
his views on the matter are much broader than the diagram of the family of images 
– in which, as explained above, I see some problems – seems to suggest. It is worth 
noting his consideration that  
 
instead of providing a transparent window on the world, 
images are now regarded as the sort of sign that presents a 
deceptive appearance of naturalness and transparence 
concealing an opaque, distorting, arbitrary mechanism of 
representation, a process of ideological mystification (ibid.:8). 
 
What, then, is the basis of this mechanism of representation? Well, he does 
not seem to be very interested in giving a concise, straightforward answer to this 
question, for he his more concerned with differentiation and collaboration, for 
instance, between graphic image and text; but, if we were to infer such an answer 
from his reflections on the subject of representation I think the touchstone to that 
answer would be that the mechanism of representation is based on inculcation (cf. 
ibid.:64 and ff.)5.  This would be consistent with the quote above and with his 
general approach to the matter, which is both historical and ideological. 
Baudrillard (1994:6), in turn, stresses that representation is based on 
equivalence (and not on concepts such as likeness, resemblance or similitude). In 
his words, representation stems from the principle of equivalence of the sign and of the real (even 
if the equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). In putting equivalence at the core 
of the process of representation and in admitting that even if equivalence is utopian 
it must be accepted as an axiom, he dismisses similitude (or likeness, or 
resemblance) and makes it a matter of convention. This axiom makes 
                                                 
5 This is, in fact, Nelson Goodman’s position, and the inference that it is also Mitchell’s  position 
stems from the fact that Mitchell seems to be in favour of it in the eleven pages he dedicates to ‘Goodman’s 
Grammar of Difference’  (Mitchell,1986:63-74). 
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categorizations, such as Pierce’s or Mitchell’s, somewhat redundant and shifts our 
attention to successive phases of the image. According to Baudrillard, these 
successive phases of the image are: 
 
It is the reflection of a profound reality; 
It masks and denatures a profound reality; 
It masks the absence of a profound reality; 
It has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure 
simulacrum. (Baudrillard, ibid.:6), 
 
Baudrillard is, in fact, more interested in simulacra than in representations, 
and so, he hardly pays any attention to the first two ‘phases of the image’, which 
would fall into the concept of representation, and concentrates more on the third 
and fourth phases, which would fall into the concept of simulacrum. However, it is 
worth noting that, even so, his views on the subject of representation are to be 
taken into account, particularly in what concerns the issue of the truth value of 
representations. 
 
On the truth value of representations 
 
Following the line of reasoning so far, I think it might be concluded that in 
representations, whatever their type may be, there is always some kind of 
convention. If that is so, it seems, at first sight, there would be no point in arguing 
about the truth value of representations. Philosophically, this is supported by 
Wittgenstein’s propositions 2.201, 2.202, 2.22, 2.221 and 5.6 of the Tratactus; 
ideologically and culturally, the prevailing thesis of an extreme conventionalism 
leads us somewhat in the same way. Mitchell, for instance, when commenting on 
Nelson Goodman’s position on the matter, writes: 
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He [Goodman] denies that there is a world to test our 
representations and descriptions against; […] he reduces all 
symbolic forms, and perhaps even all acts of perception, to 
culturally relative constructions or interpretations. And this 
reduction of symbols to referential conventions seems to 
eliminate all essential differences between different types of 
signs. (Mitchell, 1986:65) 
 
Theoretically, this position is sustainable, and it is also consistent with my 
remark above that without mental image there is no representation, be it on the 
part of the producer, be it on the art of the receiver. At this point I think it is useful 
to make an incursion into the theory of reference, which I think is quite 
enlightening for the issue of representation: Searle (1969) puts forth three axioms - 
the axiom of existence, the axiom of identity and the axiom of identification: 
 
Axiom of existence 
Whatever is referred to must exist. (Searle, 1969:77) 
 
Axiom of identity 
Whenever two expressions refer to the same object, one can be 
substituted for another without changing the truth value of the 
corresponding sentence. (Searle, 1969:97) 
 
Axiom of identification 
If a speaker refers to an object, then he identifies or is able on 
demand to identify that object for the hearer apart from all 
other objects. (Searle, 1969:79) 
 
In spite of the fact that Searle is of course referring to verbal signs, and 
moreover, to verbal signs as used in the speech act of reference (and not of 
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predication), I think one should pay some attention to what is implied in these 
three axioms.  
Starting with the axiom of existence, Searle clearly points out that it does not 
imply ontological existence: 
 
References to fictional (and also legendary, mythological, etc.) 
entities are not counter-examples. One can refer to them as 
fictional characters precisely because they exist in fiction. 
(Searle, 1969:78) 
 
Now the possibility of creating fiction, and with it the possibility of making 
reference to entities without real-world counterparts, opens up the scope of the 
axiom of existence to almost anything. This is further corroborated and clearly 
spelled out by Polenz (1985), who sustains that one can refer to what does not 
exist, and who considers the creation of  objects of reference is an elementary right 
of any speaker/writer (Polenz, 1985:119). Although Polenz is also referring to 
verbal signs, I think that what he sustains can be applied to any type of sign: sign 
inscriptions/representations are creations, with or without real-world counterparts. 
In my view, this clarifies the issue as follows: the inscription of any sign, be it 
iconic, indexical or symbolic, is an act of creation; as such, it has its own truth 
value. The difficult question left to answer remains then: how do we measure that 
value in case there is a real-world counterpart? The answer to that question 
involves two instances: the producer and the receiver of the representation and 
here there may be a mismatch, i.e., the producer may think there is a relation of 
likeness, resemblance or similitude between representation and real-world correlate 
where the receiver may find none. This is where convention and inculcation step in, 
as they make likeness, resemblance or similitude irrelevant. But at this point we 
must be aware of one thing: if the touchstone is convention, then it must be shared 
by producer and receiver alike and inculcation (of that convention) must have taken 
place; otherwise, the receiver will not find any relation whatsoever between 
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representation and real-world correlate. He may, then, act, according to Searle’s 
axiom of identity ask the producer to substitute that representation for another, or, 
according to Searle’s axiom of identification, ask questions to the producer, but this 
is, of course, only possible if the producer is available and in most cases he/she is 
not.  
This leaves us again with the issue of convention and inculcation, which 
implies shared knowledge, and when we talk about shared knowledge of this kind 
we are within the realm of culture.  
 
On the cultural and ideological importance of representations 
 
How important are representations for a culture? Following the reasoning so 
far, one can give a very simple answer: they are important in that they imply shared 
knowledge, and that is an aggregative element not to be despised in any culture. 
But how is that knowledge shared? As we have seen, by the mechanisms of 
convention and inculcation. And who is in a privileged position to master those 
mechanisms? Those who have the power, namely political, religious, economic or 
other, and, of course, the media, which are, in one way or the other, dependent on 
those powers. 
By mastering those mechanisms, the powers referred to can either fabricate 
representations or appropriate representations. Examples of fabrication of 
representations in politics, religion or economy are to be found everywhere: in 
political campaigns, in the liturgies associated with religions, or in the forms of 
expression of late capitalism as a system6. A good account of appropriation of 
representations can be found in Sarmento (2010: 14 and ff.), where the case of 
‘folk’ is analysed, and it is demonstrated that ‘folk’ was a genuine cultural 
                                                 
6 See Jameson (1998: 30), who considers the new cultural production as ‘a general modification of 
culture itself’. 
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representation, which was then domesticated and used in Portugal by Salazar’s 
regime against the working class movements and trade-unionism of urban areas. 
 
Fabrication and/or appropriation of representations by power turns them 
into simulacra, in that, in Baudrillard’s words, they either mask the absence of a 
profound reality or have no relation to reality whatsoever, or, in Mitchell’s words, 
they are the result of a process of ideological mystification. 
 
Coda 
 
The aim of this paper was to revisit the concept of ‘representation’ in order 
to shed some light into the process by which it is said that x represents y. To do so, 
matters like truth value, culture and ideology had to be called upon. Theoretically 
much has been advanced in recent years, and much more is expected to come, 
particularly if we bear in mind the swift developments and the sophistication that 
characterizes the use of representations in the aftermath of 9/11.   
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